Perks for former Presidents: between the legal framework and the necessary political debate

The discussion surrounding the privileges granted to former Heads of State in Mozambique has returned to the center of the public sphere, driven by a context of increasing social and economic pressure. This time, the focus is on Daniel Chapo, in a debate that, while legitimate, has been conducted based on partially flawed premises and a worrying personalization of the problem.

Contrary to the widespread perception on social media and in some opinion forums, the privileges granted to former Presidents of the Republic are not a recent innovation, nor do they result from a discretionary decision by the current Head of State.

The legal framework governing these matters has been structurally consolidated since the approval of Law No. 32/2014, of December 30, which revised and republished Law No. 21/92. This law systematically establishes the rights, duties, and privileges of the President of the Republic, both during the exercise of his functions and after the termination of his mandate.

More recently, Decree No. 9/2026, of March 27, merely regulated and operationalized provisions already enshrined in law. In other words, it does not create new privileges, but rather implements a regulatory framework previously approved by the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique.

This point is central to understanding the debate. In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, the separation of powers prevents the President of the Republic from unilaterally altering laws approved by the legislative body. Any substantial modification to the system of privileges necessarily requires a formal legislative process.

The current controversy largely stems from the overlapping of two distinct discussions.

On the one hand, there is a substantive and legitimate question: is it appropriate for a country with significant structural challenges, particularly regarding poverty, access to public services, and social inequality, to maintain a wide range of benefits for former Heads of State? These include official vehicles, permanent security, medical assistance, support offices, travel expenses, and various subsidies.

This is a debate of a political, economic, and ethical nature, which requires a balanced analysis of the proportionality and sustainability of these benefits in the national context.

On the other hand, a problematic dimension emerges: the personalization of the debate. Attributing direct responsibility for a pre-existing legal regime to the current President not only distorts the facts but also weakens public understanding of how institutions function.

Criticism, when shifted from the institutional to the individual level, tends to lose analytical rigor and compromise the quality of democratic debate.

It is important to emphasize that, in theory, the benefits granted to former Heads of State are not exclusively privileges. They form part of a set of institutional guarantees with specific objectives:

To preserve the dignity of the presidential office, even after the end of the term;

To ensure the personal safety of former Presidents, who may remain targets of political or strategic risks;

To protect sensitive information and state secrets;

To avoid situations of vulnerability that could affect institutional stability.

This model is not unique to Mozambique. In established democracies, such as the United States of America, former presidents benefit from lifetime pensions, security provided by federal entities, and ongoing institutional support. The difference often lies in calibrating these benefits in relation to the country's economic capacity and societal expectations.

The existence of social discomfort regarding these privileges is a real and politically relevant fact. However, its resolution is not achieved through episodic indignation or media pressure, but rather through formal mechanisms of legislative review.

Any reassessment of the current system must take place within the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique, through concrete proposals, pluralistic debate, and democratic deliberation. It is in this forum that the adequacy, limits, and potential reformulation of these benefits can be rigorously discussed.

The debate about the privileges of former Heads of State is not only legitimate but necessary. However, its effectiveness depends on conceptual clarity and rigor in identifying the problems.

More than seeking immediate culprits, it is important to question the current model and assess its compatibility with national priorities. Democratic maturity is largely measured by the ability to distinguish between institutional critique and political personalization.

Mozambique faces the challenge of balancing the dignity of its institutions with the demands of social justice. And this balance can only be achieved through an informed, structured debate oriented towards lasting solutions.