Mistakes of the War in Cabo Delgado: when strategy fails and the people pay the price

Paulo Vilanculo"

Since 2017, when the first armed attacks were recorded in districts such as Mocímboa da Praia and Palma, the Mozambican state has responded predominantly militarily. However, this approach has proven limited. One of the main mistakes was underestimating the nature of the conflict, initially treated as organized crime or local banditry, when in fact it was evolving into an insurgency with ideological overtones, transnational networks, and deep socioeconomic roots. The entry of foreign forces, including troops from Rwanda and SADC, brought visible military gains, such as the recovery of strategic territories. However, this tactical success was not accompanied by a sustainable stabilization strategy. The dependence on external forces exposes internal weaknesses and raises doubts about the Mozambican state's ability to guarantee security autonomously.

Rwanda has been establishing itself as a "security exporter" in Africa. By intervening in Mozambique, it reinforces its image as a reliable partner for stabilization missions. This increases its diplomatic weight with Western powers and international institutions. It is known that external missions like this often rely on funding or logistical support from international partners such as the European Union or other allies. Rwanda projects power without fully bearing the costs and also strengthens strategic relationships. On the other hand, the intervention places Rwanda in a region where it traditionally did not have much influence, an area historically dominated by blocs such as SADC. This expands its political reach on the continent.

In a diplomatic exercise bordering on contradiction, Rwanda raises the flag of defending Mozambique's sovereignty in Cabo Delgado, presenting itself as a guarantor of stability against insurgency. Meanwhile, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, international accusations persist that Kigali supports the M23 Movement, an armed group that directly challenges Congolese sovereignty. Rwanda simultaneously manages to be seen as a reliable security partner by countries and international institutions, such as Mozambique, and as a controversial actor in Congo. Between discourse and practice, Rwanda plays on two fronts, exposing the fragilities of a regional order where coherence gives way to geopolitical pragmatism. In other words, sovereignty ceases to be a fixed value and becomes a political tool. This contrast can be described as a paradox of selective sovereignty or, more bluntly, as a classic case of political realism applied to African geopolitics.

This ambiguity is not accidental; it's a strategy that maximizes gains on different fronts. In both cases, the common denominator is the defense of interests, not necessarily normative coherence. Rwanda is not in Cabo Delgado merely out of altruism. It's there strategically. The interest is not just in projecting power and gaining international legitimacy. Rwanda gains influence, prestige, military experience, and potential economic advantages. In Cabo Delgado, Rwanda presents itself as a defender of Mozambique's territorial integrity, combating insurgent groups and helping the state regain control over strategic areas for gas exploration and mining extraction. Rwanda's presence in Cabo Delgado is not just a gesture of regional solidarity or a fight against terrorism; there are concrete, strategic, and political benefits for Kigali. Although not always publicly detailed, there are indications of bilateral agreements involving security in exchange for economic opportunities. Cabo Delgado is rich in natural gas and other resources, and the stabilization of the region is of interest to multinationals and investors. Rwanda positions itself as a preferred partner in this ecosystem.

Another critical overlooked error is the economic dimension of the conflict. Cabo Delgado is a region rich in natural resources, including natural gas, rubies, and timber. However, the local population continues to live in extreme poverty. The promise of development associated with megaprojects, such as gas in the Rovuma basin, has not translated into concrete benefits for the communities, fueling frustrations that can be exploited by armed groups. This disconnect has opened space for the exploitation of resentments, inequalities, and promises of inclusion, especially among marginalized youth. Furthermore, criticism persists regarding the lack of transparency in conflict management. Conflicting information, lack of accountability, and allegations of abuses by defense forces contribute to undermining public trust. In this context, the war ceases to be solely against insurgents and becomes a battle for the legitimacy of the state itself.

The recent indication that Rwanda may reconsider its military presence in Cabo Delgado raises a serious alarm about the direction of the war against the insurgency in northern Mozambique. More than a diplomatic or military episode, it is a symptom of accumulated strategic, political, and social failures that have marked this conflict since its beginning. Cabo Delgado needs not only soldiers, it needs a state, a present, just state capable of listening. The possible withdrawal of Rwanda should be interpreted as a sign of exhaustion and, above all, as a warning of the lack of a lasting military solution to a problem that is, in essence, political and social. Without structural reforms, economic inclusion, social justice, and community reconciliation, any victory on the battlefield will only be temporary. Thus, the mistakes of war will continue to be repeated, and the cost will, as always, be paid by the most vulnerable.

2025/12/3