Fuels in Mozambique: end of IMOPETRO and rise of the ENAPP state monopoly

Paulo Vilanculo"

According to the government spokesperson, Inocêncio Impissa: “The crisis made us realize certain things, it forced us to conduct an immediate study of the market and the universal reality, and we realized that, in most states, especially in Africa, this business is normally conducted by a public entity, while we were doing it with an entity that included a large part of the private sector, IMOPETRO, and certain decisions were not made with the authority of the State,” revealed Impissa. For the Government, this decision aims to give the State greater control over the fuel import and supply chain; the new model “will improve the efficiency in fuel supply” and “the capacity to respond in emergency situations,” adopting solutions that best safeguard the public interest and the continuity of supply, in addition to promoting the participation of licensed companies awaiting the start of operations. ENAPP's purpose is to provide, on an exclusive basis, agency, intermediation and integrated management services for the national procurement process of petroleum products intended to supply the national market, "ensuring its planning, contracting, coordination, monitoring and other acts necessary for the regularity, efficiency, transparency and security of supply". "Given its strategic nature for the functioning of the national economy", the decision represents "a qualitative leap" in relation to the control of this product, described as "essential for the economy". (Inocêncio Impissa - Speaking to journalists at the end of the 20th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers)

The oil sector moves billions of meticais annually, inevitably becoming one of the main centers of economic and political interest. Concentrating fuel imports in a single public company may mean increasing the Government's responsibility to demonstrate that the new model will be conducted with high standards of transparency. Another aspect that deserves reflection concerns the impact of the measure on private investors. However, for decades, several companies have built logistical capacities, storage infrastructure, and distribution networks based on the previously existing model. Changing the rules of the game requires regulatory clarity and predictability, otherwise it risks generating uncertainties that could affect future investments in strategic sectors of the national economy. The presence of private operators in an import entity does not eliminate the State's sovereignty nor prevent it from defining rules, monitoring contracts, or imposing strategic guidelines. The main contradiction lies in the fact that the Government attributes the model's failures to private participation when, in reality, the State has always exercised regulatory and supervisory power over IMOPETRO. If certain decisions "were not made with the authority of the State," this may reveal more a weakness in public governance than an intrinsic problem with the company's structure. If the Government considered its capacity to influence strategic decisions insufficient, the question that arises is why this limitation persisted for more than two decades without the legal and institutional supervisory mechanisms at its disposal being activated.

However, granting a state monopoly should not automatically eliminate the problems of efficiency, transparency, and good governance that have historically affected several Mozambican state-owned companies. National experience demonstrates that the mere fact that an activity returns to state control does not guarantee better results. The central question, therefore, is not only who imports the fuels, but how this activity will be managed. The real challenge will be to build an institutional model that combines economic efficiency, administrative transparency, supply stability, and protection of the public interest. Thus, the replacement of IMOPETRO by ENAPP may represent less a response to the alleged weaknesses of the previous model, but a belated recognition of governance failures that the State itself failed to correct.

In justifying the creation of ENAPP with the argument that "in most states, especially in South Africa, 'the fuel business is conducted by a public entity'," the Executive seems to base a structural reform on a logic of institutional comparison, instead of presenting concrete evidence about the economic and social impacts that this change will produce in the Mozambican context. In matters of public policy, the simple reproduction of models adopted by other countries does not, in itself, constitute a criterion of effectiveness. Each state has distinct economic realities, institutional capacities, levels of governance, and market structures. What should underpin a decision of this magnitude are economic impact studies, cost-benefit analyses, risk assessments, and consultations with the different actors in the sector, objectively demonstrating that the new model will produce effective gains for the national economy and the well-being of citizens. Without this demonstration, the reference to the experience of other countries risks transforming a strategic decision into a policy based more on institutional imitation than on scientific evidence.

The real debate should not be whether other African countries use state-owned companies to import fuels, but rather whether Mozambique has the institutional conditions, transparency mechanisms, and management capacity necessary for this model to produce better results than the previous one. Nigeria, the continent's largest oil producer, demonstrates that the success of energy policy does not depend exclusively on the state monopolizing fuel imports or refining. The true differentiating factor is not the public or private nature of the entity operating the sector, but the quality of the institutions that regulate it. Therefore, using the argument that "most African states" adopt a particular model does not, in itself, demonstrate that this model is the most suitable for Mozambique, especially without comparative studies that assess its economic, fiscal, and social impacts. The commissioning of the Dangote Refinery, a fully private undertaking, shows that private investment can play a strategic role in strengthening national energy security, provided there is a state capable of regulating the market, defining clear rules, and safeguarding the public interest. The case of Nigeria serves as a counterpoint to demonstrate that there are alternative models of success in Africa and that the choice of public policy should be supported by empirical evidence, and not just by analogies with other countries.

There are also numerous examples where state monopolies have been marked by inefficiency, indebtedness, corruption, and political capture. The effectiveness of a system does not depend on the public or private nature of the managing entity, but on the quality of the institutions, transparency, regulatory capacity, and accountability mechanisms. Invoking the experience of other countries without demonstrating that these models have produced better results for consumers constitutes an insufficient argument from authority to justify a structural reform of this magnitude. Economic development depends more on the quality of governance than on the ownership of strategic assets. Douglass North argues that economic performance depends on the quality of institutions and the rules that guide their operation, and not on the mere adoption of models used in other countries. Similarly, Peter Evans demonstrates that successful public policies depend on the administrative capacity of the State and its adaptation to local specificities.

Without robust mechanisms for oversight, accountability, and independent control, public monopolies can become privileged spaces for corruption, political favoritism, institutional capture, and administrative inefficiency. If ENAPP (National Energy and Petroleum Enterprises) manages to act with technical criteria, operational independence, and financial rigor, it could represent a significant step forward in consolidating national energy security. On the other hand, by stating that "certain decisions were not made with the authority of the State," the Government implicitly transfers to the IMOPETRO structure a responsibility that, ultimately, belonged to the State itself as regulator, shareholder, and main guarantor of public policies in the energy sector. The creation of ENAPP offers this opportunity, but its success should not depend on the decree that created it, but rather on the quality of the management and regulation of public affairs.

2025/12/3