CHAPO’S DARK GAME AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF MOZAMBICANS DUE TO SECRET AGREEMENTS WITH THE SO-CALLED OPPOSITION PARTIES

Paulo Vilanculo"

The official version of historical events in Mozambique has often been shaped according to the interests of the ruling party, FRELIMO. As Borges Coelho (2013) argues, "the official Mozambican history was constructed in order to legitimize the political hegemony of the government, minimizing controversial aspects of the agreements". This means that certain contents of the agreements were omitted or reinterpreted to reinforce the authority of the government and delegitimize political opponents. In the post-independence period, the government shaped the historical narrative to consolidate its political legitimacy (Borges Coelho, 2013). The government, in power since independence in 1975, has been criticized for maintaining secrecy regarding the terms of the agreements signed with the so-called opposition at the time. During the colonial and post-independence periods, the disclosure of strategic information has always been under strong state control. In 1974, the Lusaka Agreement was signed between FRELIMO and the Portuguese government, ending colonial rule. However, the information released to the public was limited and selective. According to Geffray (1991), "the monopoly of information was an essential tool for the ruling party to consolidate its power in the transition to independence."

Looking at the Nkomati (or Incomati) Agreement, signed on 16 March 1984 between Mozambique and apartheid South Africa, it was a non-aggression treaty that aimed to end mutual support for insurgent movements: Mozambique committed itself not to support the ANC (African National Congress), while South Africa promised to cease support for RENAMO. Although officially presented as a step towards peace, the agreement contained secret clauses that, according to analysts, disproportionately favoured the apartheid regime, including military and surveillance requirements against ANC activists inside Mozambique. The signing was made under strong military and economic pressure, with Mozambique facing sabotage and blockades from South Africa. However, the agreement was not widely publicised because it ran counter to African solidarity and the anti-apartheid principles that the Mozambican government publicly defended. Revealing its full content would have exposed the fragility of the Mozambican state in the face of apartheid and could have caused diplomatic ruptures with strategic allies, such as the countries of the socialist bloc and African liberation movements. In addition, there would have been a strong internal reaction from the population and political forces that saw the ANC as an ideological and historical ally.Bottom of the form

 

Similarly, the General Peace Agreement (GPA), signed in 1992 between FRELIMO and RENAMO, was partially disclosed. Similarly, in the case of the hidden debts, official communication was initially manipulated to minimize the impact of the scandal, trying to justify the loans as necessary for national security (Hanlon, 2018). In all cases, decisions were made without public consultation and without a transparent democratic process. The government and the signatories had an interest in controlling the narrative about the commitments made to avoid public questioning or political instability (Newitt, 1995). In this way, the limited disclosure of the agreements aimed to consolidate the government's hegemony and minimize possible popular protests. On the other hand, the concealment of debts between 2013 and 2016 followed a similar purpose.

The Mozambican government borrowed more than US$2 billion without the knowledge of the people it governed, concealing crucial information about the financial impact on the country (Hanlon, 2018). In the case of hidden debts, the contracts were signed in secret, and the population only became aware of the scandal when the information was exposed by international investigations (Nuvunga & Mbanze, 2019). In the case of agreements, Mozambicans were only informed of the decisions after they were signed (Cahen, 1993). However, when agreements are negotiated behind closed doors, Mozambicans are prevented from fully understanding the conditions under which their political representation is being defined in a way that, as Przeworski (1991) argues, is essential for the people to act effectively within a democratic system. The failure to disclose the contents of the Lusaka Agreement (1974) and the General Peace Agreement (1992) in Mozambique can be compared and strengthened by the analysis of the failure to disclose hidden debts, one of the country's biggest financial scandals. Both cases reflect a historical pattern of lack of transparency, control of information and opaque management of political and economic decisions.

The current agreement between the government of Mozambique and the opposition parties, especially PODEMOS and other smaller ones, can be analyzed in light of the context of political stabilization, but also with attention to possible hidden contours and future implications, of which we can describe the current secrecy of the agreements between the ruling party in Mozambique and the opposition parties as a clear manifestation of democratic fragility, political manipulation and an attempt to silence the post-electoral conflict, especially after the elections of October 9, 2024, widely denounced as fraudulent and impartial in the following contours:

Backroom deals with lack of transparency -Post-election agreements have been characterized by closed-door negotiations, without public consultation or official clarification on the terms negotiated. The government, under the leadership of the ruling party, has maintained absolute secrecy regarding commitments made with the opposition, fueling speculation about exchanges of political favors and distribution of positions.

Silencing of electoral contestation -In the face of accusations of electoral fraud, voter intimidation and manipulation of results, the secret agreements appear to be aimed at neutralizing the opposition, demobilizing protests and institutional contestation, in exchange for strategic benefits for opposition leaders, while ignoring the will of the people.

Erosion of democratic legitimacy -This secrecy undermines the legitimacy of democratic institutions, especially the National Electoral Commission (CNE), the electoral courts and the Assembly of the Republic, which are seen as complicit or powerless in the face of irregularities. The result is the weakening of citizen participation, which perceives political processes as a closed game between elites.

Access to political financing resources -Undisclosed agreements may involve the distribution of positions, state resources and economic concessions as a form of “political calm”. This can create a system of covert clientelism, in which the opposition is co-opted to support the government in exchange for benefits, weakening effective oversight.

Tacit impunity agreements -There are indications that the agreements include unwritten pacts to protect members of the government and opposition from judicial investigations, especially in cases of corruption or responsibility for acts of political violence. This sustains an environment of systemic impunity.

Possible immunities and secret commitments -As in the past, there may be informal or secret clauses, such as promises of immunity from prosecution for political leaders involved in scandals, or agreements not to investigate certain political and financial crimes.

Both the lack of transparency in the agreements and the concealment of debts had long-lasting consequences. The opacity of the Lusaka and Peace Agreements contributed to political instability and the outbreak of civil war (Geffray, 1991). The case of hidden debts resulted in the financial collapse of Mozambique, worsening the economic and social crisis, with direct impacts on the increase in poverty and the loss of international credibility (Nuvunga & Mbanze, 2019). While in the past the failure to disclose agreements served to centralize power and control the historical narrative, the concealment of debts served to benefit political elites and corruption networks. Both cases show that the lack of transparency not only limits the population's right to information, but also has devastating long-term impacts. These episodes illustrate how the Mozambican population has been repeatedly excluded from crucial decisions, resulting in distrust in institutions and the perpetuation of crises.

By analogy between these events, we can understand a vicious cycle of governmental opacity in Mozambique. Just like an underground river that is only noticed when its waters emerge and cause erosion, the lack of transparency in crucial decisions ends up, sooner or later, generating political, economic and social crises. If the agreement is genuine, it can contribute to the reduction of tensions and democratic consolidation. However, if it is marked by opacity, institutional manipulation and co-optation of the opposition, it can result in a pseudo-peace, with an appearance of stability, but sustained by backroom deals and an absence of real justice. The absence of a participatory process in the negotiation of agreements has always resulted in the omission of information from the population. As Cahen (1993) points out, "Mozambicans were informed of the decisions already made, with no room for influence or public debate". This occurred mainly because the agreements were strategic decisions that involved geopolitical and military interests, and the leaders feared that wide disclosure could generate resistance or internal opposition. Excluding the population from knowledge about political agreements can generate apathy and distrust in relation to politics. For O'Donnell (1994), a democratic regime must ensure that its citizens have the means to monitor and evaluate government decisions. The lack of transparency can foster a feeling of powerlessness in society, making the electoral process a mere ritual with no real impact.

Government transparency is one of the fundamental pillars of a functioning democracy, ensuring citizen participation and trust in institutions. In the case of Mozambique, the opacity in the disclosure of agreements between the Mozambican government and opposition parties has raised concerns about the future of the country. According to Dahl (1989), democracy depends on open political competition and an environment in which information is widely accessible to citizens. Secrecy regarding political agreements also has economic consequences. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), inclusive institutions are essential for economic development, while those that favor closed elites perpetuate inequalities and hinder social progress. The lack of transparency in negotiations between the government and the opposition can reinforce patterns of clientelism and impede economic reforms necessary for the well-being of the population. It is known that the failure to disclose the contents of the Agreements is due to political, social and structural factors. The control of information, the lack of transparency in the decision-making process, the instrumentalization of history and the difficulties in communication have contributed to keeping a large part of the population unaware of the details of these agreements. Given this scenario, it is imperative that there be a growing demand for greater transparency in political negotiations in Mozambique. Civil society, the press and international organizations have a crucial role to play in pushing for more open democratic practices. Only with full access to information and active citizen participation will it be possible to guarantee a more just and equitable future for Mozambicans.

However, the current secrecy not only violates the principles of transparency and public accountability, but also establishes a model of “rotten peace,” where conflicts are temporarily suppressed but popular distrust, political exclusion, and social resentment continue to grow. This poses a risk to long-term stability, as it prevents the construction of a democracy based on justice, respect for rights, and effective citizen participation, above all, only to postpone latent conflicts and strengthen a political oligarchy, delegitimizing the democratic process.

Bibliographic References

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2025/12/3