Bank of Mozambique, an example of camaraderie in the distribution of trophies to branches

Paulo Vilanculo"

The core issue addressed in the title above is not institutional or symbolic. The appointment of Artemísia Gove Silva as director of the Bank of Mozambique branch in Sofala province, and the subsequent appointment of Élio Jonasse to head the issuing bank's branch in Zambézia, have opened a front of public questioning that goes far beyond the individuals appointed. It touches on the lack of transparency and meritocracy in state institutions and ignites an old, recurring, and sensitive debate in Mozambican society: to what extent are appointments in strategic institutions exclusively influenced by family ties, political connections, and institutionalized camaraderie, rather than by technical and professional criteria? Uncomfortable but unavoidable questions arise, such as: at what age did Artemísia Gove Silva complete her banking training? In what year did she join the Bank of Mozambique? Was there a public competition? How many candidates applied for the position, and what objective criteria determined her approval? Are we witnessing the result of an exemplary technical career, or just another case where the surname carries as much weight as the resume?How can a manager dismissed from a strategic public company be, shortly afterwards, called upon to assume a position, in this specific case, of high responsibility in an institution that demands institutional technical rigor and full credibility from the financial system?

 The recurring pattern of cases where children, relatives, or those close to former or current elites are dragged into and placed in strategic state positions reinforces the idea that public institutions function more as spaces for the reproduction of privileges than merit. Opportunities and access to strategic positions continue to be perceived as restricted to specific circles. The recent appointment of Artemísia Gove Silva as director of the Bank of Mozambique branch in Sofala province—daughter of Ernesto Gove, former governor of the Bank of Mozambique, a historically influential figure in the national financial system—attests to the fact that technical merit alone rarely breaks through the invisible barriers to power. The ambiguity that emerges among the population is not a result of ignorance or bad faith, but of a collective memory marked by practices of favoritism, clientelism, and the politicization of public institutions. Ernesto Gove, the father of the current director, governed the Bank of Mozambique for a decade, between 2006 and 2016, a period of strong consolidation of his institutional power and influence in the national financial system.

While one might imagine the spectacular nature and quality of her training at world-class institutions, the question arises as to at what age she completed her training, when she applied for positions, and how she acquired the concrete experience necessary to ascend to this public office of such great responsibility. Although official discourse suggests and emphasizes the newly appointed director's technical competence, academic background, and professional experience, public perception, especially in a country marked by profound inequalities and skilled unemployment, tends to question the neutrality of the process and the transparency of the selection and appointment criteria. The central problem with the appointment is not legal. The appointment may be legal, the training may be adequate, and the director may even demonstrate high competence in the performance of her duties. The challenge facing the Bank of Mozambique is not only to prove the competence of the new director of the Sofala branch through results, but also to reaffirm, unequivocally, that access to top positions does not function as a distribution of trophies among historical circles of power. More than names and surnames, what is at stake is the institutional governance model that Mozambique intends to consolidate.

This episode is not isolated, but symptomatic of a system where the problem lies not only with the people, but also with how institutions decide and recycle power. The recent appointment, on the other hand, of Élio Jonasse to the position of Director of the Bank of Mozambique's branch in Zambézia province raises another institutional weakness marked by contradictions that defy administrative logic.Élio Jonasse, a journalist, although he had experience with the Bank of Mozambique in the Central Bank's Communications Office, having been appointed to the position of director of the same Bank in Niassa and later rising to the position of Chairman of the Board of Directors of TVM, andIn December 2025, Élio Jonasse was dismissed from his position as Chairman of the Board of Directors of TVM within the Mozambican state apparatus, in a context that was never clearly understood by the public, as is common in the management of top executives in Mozambican public companies and institutions. Dismissal, by administrative definition, presupposes failures, non-compliance with objectives, loss of political confidence, or the need for strategic change. This paradoxical contradiction exposes a recurring weakness in Mozambican public administration, where dismissal does not always signify professional disapproval, just as appointment does not always result from a public evaluation of merit and performance. In many cases, dismissal is merely a mechanism of political rotation, an internal readjustment of interests, or a strategic repositioning within the same power structure. The case of Élio Jonasse illustrates a logic where the same face circulates between different institutions, regardless of the technical or sectoral nature of the functions performed.

It may be logical that a strong Central Bank is not measured solely by its macroeconomic indicators, but also by the social trust it inspires—a trust that is built every day through choices that withstand public scrutiny and that manage to unambiguously separate technical merit from family ties and cronyism. In an institution where thousands of qualified technicians await opportunities for advancement, basing this on the retraining of dismissed staff for positions of equal or greater responsibility conveys a contradictory message in which dismissal ceases to be an act of accountability and becomes merely an interval between appointments. On the streets, in informal analysis circles, more discerning popular opinions interpret Élio Jonasse's rise to the new position as a "trophy," a kind of symbolic bonus, awarded for the role he played throughout the country's recent sensitive political processes, for his effective work of strategic silence, discursive management, and political image laundering during critical moments in national democratic life, from the municipal and general election campaigns to the turbulent period of post-election demonstrations. The recognized merit is not necessarily linked to technical banking or financial supervision skills, but to his demonstrated ability to align narratives, contain media damage, and contribute to a controlled communication environment, in a context where public information was marked by asymmetries, omissions, and selective silences. The appointment appears as a reward for loyalty and political effectiveness, rather than a result of an objective evaluation of his professional performance at the Central Bank in Lichinga.

In the reality of skilled unemployment in Mozambique, a frustration stemming from generational exclusion rooted in a long history of favoritism within public institutions, where thousands of highly qualified young people remain excluded from strategic decision-making, the perception of injustice weighs as heavily as factual reality. The lack of transparency transforms any sensitive appointment into a symbol of unequal access to power; the problem is institutional.While the State proclaims technique, neutrality, and transparency as pillars of governance, these appointments, shrouded in obscurity regarding clear public criteria, end up functioning as symbols of a system where positions of high responsibility are socially interpreted as rewards, compensations, or trophies for services rendered to those in power.Although these interpretations do not constitute legally proven facts, they gain traction in a country where the overlap between political communication, crisis management, and institutional promotion has become commonplace.As long as this perception persists, the Central Bank will continue not only to regulate banks, but also, unintentionally, to regulate public distrust, paying a high price in institutional credibility with a population that is no longer satisfied with mere rhetoric but demands consistency between proclaimed principles and real practices.Institutional silence will not protect the credibility of the nominees; on the contrary, it weakens them and undermines the confidence in the Bank of Mozambique itself.

2025/12/3