Between the Letter of the Law and the Spirit of the Game: When the Law Fails in Time and Ethics

Alexandre Mabasso"

The recent decision by the Confederation of African Football (CAF) to overturn the result of the Africa Cup of Nations (CAN) final, administratively awarding the victory to Morocco by 3-0, is not merely a controversial episode from a sporting perspective. Above all, it is a paradigmatic case of the decontextualized application of legal norms, exposing serious weaknesses in the articulation between sports law, competitive ethics, and the principle of legal certainty.

The factual picture is unequivocal: Senegal won the title on the field, after a match that was effectively played and concluded, albeit marked by a moment of tension, embodied in the temporary abandonment of the pitch by their team. This behavior, reprehensible under the regulations, was, however, reversed during the match, with the game being resumed, concluded, and validated by the competent authorities present at the venue, referees, commissioners, and other representatives of the organization.

It is precisely at this point that the first and most relevant legal question emerges: jurisdiction and the duty of immediate action. If, as CAF later argues, Article 84 of the regulations classifies leaving the field as an offense equivalent to a partial failure to appear, then such a violation should have been assessed and sanctioned at the time it occurred, or, at the latest, immediately after the end of the match, before the result was ratified.

Law, as a normative system, is not exhausted by the existence of rules; rather, it demands their timely, coherent, and proportionate application. Failure to intervene at the appropriate time constitutes, in legal terms, a tacit preclusion of the sanctioning power in its most serious dimension. By allowing the game to continue, validating the result, and proceeding with the awarding of the trophy, CAF itself created a legitimate legal expectation not only for the direct participants but for the entire football ecosystem that the result obtained on the field was definitive.

The subsequent reversal of this reality, more than a month later, constitutes a clear violation of the principle of legal certainty, the cornerstone of any credible normative order. No sporting competition can maintain its legitimacy if the results are subject to late review based on grounds that were already known and verifiable at the time they occurred.

Even more serious is the inversion of priorities that this decision reveals: administrative formality, the "letter of the law," is privileged over the sporting substance, the "spirit of the game." However, modern sports law has evolved precisely in the opposite direction, seeking to harmonize the application of rules with the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and substantive justice.

This is clearly not about ignoring the infraction committed. Abandoning the field is behavior that should be discouraged and sanctioned, otherwise it compromises the integrity of the competitions. However, this sanction must be appropriate to the context and the moment. In this case, the game was resumed, concluded, and produced a full sporting result. Any punishment should therefore focus on those responsible through fines, suspensions, or other disciplinary measures, and not on the final result, which has already been consolidated.

By opting for the most extreme solution, the withdrawal of the title, CAF is clearly acting disproportionately. This is a sanction that far exceeds the seriousness of the conduct, especially when the conduct was corrected in a timely manner and did not prevent the match from being played in its entirety.

From an ethical standpoint, the decision is equally questionable. Football, as a social and cultural phenomenon, rests on a deeply rooted symbolic dimension: what happens on the field takes precedence. Altering, in an office, an outcome constructed before millions of spectators represents a break with this fundamental principle. It is, ultimately, a devaluation of the game itself as a space for decision-making.

It is also important to emphasize that the system had, in fact, already reacted to the irregular behavior. The public exposure of the incident, the media scrutiny, and the eventual disciplinary accountability of those involved constitute sufficient deterrent mechanisms to prevent similar situations in the future. Late intervention, with retroactive effects on the outcome, does not reinforce the authority of the rule; on the contrary, it weakens it by demonstrating inconsistency in its application.

This case clearly demonstrates the urgent need to strengthen the legal dimension in the management of competitions. The presence of sports law specialists in operational bodies, with the capacity for immediate decision-making, is not a luxury, but a requirement of a system that aims to be credible, predictable, and fair.

In short, the CAF decision fails not only in its content; it fails, above all, in its timing, form, and criteria. By intervening belatedly, taking the rule out of context, and applying a disproportionate sanction, the organization compromises fundamental principles of sports law and ethics. And, in this process, it ends up producing a more serious effect than the behavior it intended to sanction: the erosion of trust in the system itself.

African football deserves better. It deserves clear rules, yes, but above all, it deserves that these rules be applied with intelligence, timeliness, and a sense of justice.

2025/12/3