The Confederation of Sahel States and the Birth of a New Strategic Order in Africa

Alberto Mudjadju"

A strategic reading of the implications for Africa, Mozambique and SADC.

Africa is undergoing a phase of profound transformations in its security architecture and power relations. For decades, regional integration processes were built around organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, the emergence and consolidation of the Confederation of Sahel States, involving Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, introduces a new dynamic to African strategic thinking. The Confederation arose from an evolution of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). On July 6, 2024, in Niamey, the three states adopted the treaty that formally established the Confederation, based, among other principles, on sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-aggression, solidarity, and the defense of the interests of the populations of the confederated states. The importance of this phenomenon therefore transcends the borders of the Sahel. The AES poses an essential question to the continent: is Africa moving towards a new architecture of integration, in which sovereignty and collective security occupy an even more central position? The answer will depend on the evolution of the Confederation. However, it is already possible to identify important strategic implications.

One of the most important characteristics of the Economic and Social Strategy (ESA) is the centrality attributed to national sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have sought closer coordination among themselves, particularly in the areas of defense and security. In January 2025, the three countries formalized their withdrawal from ECOWAS, after completing the process foreseen for withdrawal. This fact does not simply mean the creation of a new regional organization. It represents a dispute over what the model of African integration should be. On one side, there is traditional regional integration, based on supranational institutions and broader economic and political mechanisms. On the other, a model emerges that prioritizes, above all, the security, sovereignty, and decision-making capacity of the states themselves. This experience deserves attention because it may influence the continental debate on strategic autonomy.

The second major dimension of the SAA is military. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger face threats that cross borders. Armed groups and organized crime networks do not necessarily respect the territorial boundaries of states. Consequently, the response also tends to extend beyond the national dimension. In December 2025, a Unified SAA Force was launched, aimed at strengthening the coordination of operations against jihadist violence and cross-border threats. This development presents an important strategic lesson: transnational threats require multinational responses. This is a particularly relevant issue for Africa, where terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling, piracy, illegal fishing, and other phenomena cross borders. Furthermore, the departure of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS created an unprecedented political reality in West Africa. ECOWAS itself recognized that the withdrawal of the three countries required new modalities of relationship, while simultaneously seeking to preserve mechanisms for circulation, trade, and regional dialogue. This demonstrates that the issue is not simply SAA versus ECOWAS. There is a much deeper question: how to build African integration when states have different perceptions of sovereignty, security, governance, and relationships with external partners? The answer to this question could determine the future of African regional integration.

For Mozambique, the Sahel experience deserves to be studied without automatically importing its political or institutional model. The main lesson lies in the need to build integrated responses to security threats. Mozambique has a different reality from that of the Sahel. However, it also faces challenges that exceed the capacity of a single institution. The experience of Cabo Delgado demonstrated the importance of regional cooperation. SADC mobilized SAMIM, which was operational in Mozambique from July 2021 and was officially closed in July 2024. The comparison with the SADC allows us to raise a pertinent question: how to transform regional security cooperation into a permanent, sustainable African capacity adapted to the characteristics of each region? This question is particularly important for Mozambique because the country has an extensive coastline, land borders with several countries, and a strategic position in the Indian Ocean.

The experience of the SADC can also stimulate reflection within SADC. SADC has its own mechanisms for cooperation in politics, defense, and security. The SAMIM experience demonstrated that there is capacity to mobilize multinational forces in defense of a member state. However, the withdrawal of SAMIM also showed the importance of discussing sustainable financing of operations, military logistics, regional intelligence, interoperability of forces, command and control, strategic mobility, joint training, and the relationship between military operations and community development.

The Sahel experience and the SADC experience need not be seen as competing models. They can constitute sources of learning for different African realities. The African experience demonstrates that terrorism and insurgency are not just military problems. They are also problems of poverty, unemployment, social exclusion, institutional fragility, cross-border crime, lack of opportunities, local disputes, arms trafficking, and radicalization. Therefore, a truly strategic security architecture needs to combine: Defense + Security + Intelligence + Development + Justice + Diplomacy + Community. This approach is particularly important for Mozambique. In combating contemporary threats, the community should not be seen only as a beneficiary of security, but as a producer of information and a security partner. It is at this point that community intelligence assumes strategic importance. The emergence of the SADC occurs at a time when Africa has become an area of ​​increasing competition between different international actors.

The United States, the European Union, Russia, China, Turkey, Gulf countries, and other powers are seeking to expand their political, economic, military, and strategic relations with African countries. In this environment, the issue of African strategic autonomy gains greater relevance. Strategic autonomy does not necessarily mean isolation. It can mean the ability to choose partners, negotiate interests, and defend national priorities without excessive dependence on a single external actor. This is an issue of interest to both the Sahel and Southern Africa.

Herein lies perhaps the main strategic question of the SAS. Declaring sovereignty is relatively simple. Building sovereign capacity is much more difficult. A state can assert its political independence but remain dependent on others for military equipment, intelligence, technology, financing, logistics, training, energy, markets, and infrastructure. Therefore, true strategic autonomy requires national and regional capacity. For Africa, the SAS experience should be followed not only by its political declarations but, above all, by its concrete results.

2025/12/3