Results? Only throughout 2026

Afonso Almeida Brandão"

THE year 2026 began with two crises that are reshaping the global geopolitical landscape: the implosion of the Chavista regime in Venezuela as a consequence of a US military operation, and the escalation of internal and external tension in Iran, which exposes deep fragilities in what remained of the so-called "sphere of influence" of Moscow and Beijing. The limits of Russian and Chinese power in the face of the intrinsic realities of the satellite states they sought to protect and use as strategic pawns are now evident. US forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in an operation that resulted in dozens of deaths among Venezuelan and Cuban security forces and wounded American soldiers. Washington justified the action with a discourse of "restoring democracy" and controlling vast oil reserves; critics denounced a flagrant violation of international law. Globally, reactions were polarized: Brazil, Mexico, and several European countries condemned the operation; China and Russia demanded Maduro's immediate release and criticized the foreign interference. The geopolitical magnitude of this crisis cannot be underestimated. Venezuela holds almost 20% of the world's oil reserves—more than any other country on the planet—but has declined to minuscule production levels due to decades of mismanagement, corruption, and sanctions. Its economy is a classic case of collapse, with chronic inflation, capital flight, and massive human exodus, generating a humanitarian crisis of regional proportions. For decades, Caracas was a strategic ally of Moscow and Beijing. Russia injected capital, weapons, and military advice; China became the largest buyer of Venezuelan oil in exchange for financing and political support. This arrangement allowed Moscow and Beijing to expand a corridor of influence in the Western Hemisphere, challenging traditional US hegemony. Until the January clash, it seemed a partnership of convenience that, nevertheless, functioned as a symbolic counterweight to American power. The US intervention changed, possibly irreversibly, this equation. American control over one of the largest energy reserves on the planet—even if temporary and uncertain—not only dilutes Chinese energy dependence but also demonstrates that Washington is still capable of projecting military power outside its immediate sphere without formal coordination with traditional allies. In practical terms, China has already begun to seek to replace Venezuelan oil with Iranian and Russian crude in its refined markets, a tactical shift that reveals Beijing's strategic volatility in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. On the Russian side, the shock was equally profound. Moscow, already absorbed by its protracted war in Ukraine, found itself unable to respond meaningfully to the loss of such a valuable ally in both symbolic and material terms. Maduro's capture exposed the limitations of Russian reach—the Kremlin could not send forces there, nor decisively influence the outcome, and ended up issuing relatively restrained criticisms. For geopolitical analysts, this represents not only a diplomatic defeat, but a sign that Russian influence outside Eurasia is waning in the face of American power, reshaped under the assertive impetus of the Trump administration. This uproar also influences Iran, which is experiencing an internal and external crisis that, on a broader scale, could reveal the fragility of another front on the same geopolitical axis. From the end of December 2025 to the first days of January 2026, Iran has been the scene of massive protests in dozens of cities, fueled by economic collapse, rampant inflation, currency devaluation, and chronic unemployment. This internal discontent occurs in an equally turbulent international context: Iran was hit in 2025 by intense tensions with Israel and the United States, with armed conflicts and bombings that struck the regime's military and nuclear infrastructure, and provoked retaliatory missile and drone strikes. The escalation has opened a fissure in Tehran's reputation as a strong center of resistance against the West, demonstrating that without a strong internal stabilizer, the capacity to project external power is also weakened. While the regime's political apparatus attempts to control the streets through repression—and aggressively stifles the press and public freedoms—the fact that the crisis has reached such deep points of social division suggests that Iran's international position is not that of a state impervious to the geopolitical and economic currents shaping its periphery. Its economy has been severely impacted by sanctions that reduce oil exports and foreign revenue, contributing to the social strangulation that translates into increasingly widespread protests. This internal reality directly affects Iran's external ambitions. A state consumed by economic crisis, social unrest, and political isolation has less room to maneuver in supporting regional allies or projecting power through militias and proxies—a role the regime has traditionally played in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The erosion of this capacity diminishes Tehran's ability to be an effective pillar for a regional architecture alternative to that promoted by Washington, Brussels, or even Beijing and Moscow. Thus, the conjunction of Venezuelan and Iranian instability reinforces a larger trend: Russian and Chinese influence projects outside their core areas face real limits when confronted with deep domestic crises and the political and military will of the US to intervene in areas considered strategic. Before the current reconfiguration, the Moscow-Beijing-Tehran axis aspired to offer an ideological and practical alternative to the US-led international order—a bloc resistant to sanctions, economic blockades, and Western alliances. In the diplomatic sphere, although Moscow and Beijing have issued statements of solidarity with Maduro and vehemently condemned the US intervention, these reactions reveal more symbolic frustration than a capacity for concrete action. Beijing, for example, expressed demands to the UN for Maduro's immediate release, but did not show a mechanism to counter American pressure. The broader lesson may well be this: global influence is not a commodity compressed into rigid, untouchable blocks, but a dynamic phenomenon, deeply vulnerable to domestic crises and power imbalances. Latin America and the Middle East, two regions once thought to be relatively peripheral to the traditional geopolitics of the great powers, have now become testing grounds for this new reality. Caracas and Tehran are case studies of this shift: regimes that survived decades with Russian and Chinese support now find themselves exposed to the combined impact of US pressure and internal fragility. In the end, more than a victory for Washington or the end of the multipolar game, we are witnessing a redistribution of power in an accelerating world. The influence of Moscow and Beijing, far from disappearing, is entering a phase of forced recalibration. However, when facing territories where the social economy is disintegrating and external support is losing effectiveness, this influence is showing limits that few will have glimpsed throughout 2026, which has now begun.

2025/12/3