THE POWER OF IMPUNITY

Adriano S. Kansala"

The dogs bark and the caravan passes

The death of Ratko Mladić in The Hague, where he was serving a life sentence for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, led Aryeh Neier to recall one of the most important experiences of international justice: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Neier's conclusion is unsettling. The Court will not have inaugurated a new era of universal accountability. Rather, it will have been a major exception in the history of international relations.

Naturally, there is no equivalence between the crimes committed during the wars of the former Yugoslavia and the current political and constitutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau. The nature, scope, and legal framework are profoundly different. But there is an institutional lesson that can—and should—be applied to our country: international decisions do not execute themselves.

The Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was created by the United Nations Security Council, but during its early years it had prosecutions, judges, and prosecutors but lacked the capacity to arrest the accused. It had legal authority, but lacked the power to execute it.

The situation only began to change when states, international forces present on the ground, and later the European Union decided to transform legal obligations into political consequences. There were arrests. There was mandatory cooperation. There was diplomatic conditioning. There were costs for those protecting the accused.

This is how the Court managed to bring all 161 surviving defendants under its jurisdiction.

The difference between a symbolic institution and an effective one, therefore, lay not in the quality of its pronouncements, but in its ability to enforce its decisions.

It is precisely here that Neier's reflection intersects with Guinea-Bissau.

Since the interruption of the electoral process and the military takeover on November 26, 2025, the African Union, ECOWAS, and other international partners have issued sufficiently clear decisions. The coup was condemned. Guinea-Bissau was suspended from African Union activities. The immediate release of detained political leaders and electoral officials was demanded. The completion of the interrupted electoral process was called for. The restoration of constitutional order was advocated.

Subsequently, demands were again made for an inclusive transitional government, the release of political prisoners, the restoration of civic space, respect for fundamental freedoms, the independence of the National Electoral Commission and the Supreme Court, non-interference by the military in politics, and the holding of credible elections.

However, the same demands reappear, almost word for word, in successive statements.

When a decision needs to be repeated indefinitely, without its non-compliance producing consequences, it progressively ceases to be a decision. It becomes a request. Then, an expression of concern. Finally, an archival piece of international impotence.

In practice, the generals and the so-called Transitional Government seem to have adopted as their political doctrine the well-known popular saying: "The dogs bark, but the caravan moves on."

While the international community protests, the caravan of usurpation advances. While the African Union and ECOWAS express "deep concern," the established power consolidates positions, restricts political space, controls institutions, and seeks to transform the fait accompli into a new normal.

Diplomacy en douceur, made up of careful appeals, protocol visits, ambiguous formulas, and warnings without consequence, has already revealed its limits. Declarations, communiqués, and other diplomatic pronouncements that do not include deadlines, verification mechanisms, and effective consequences go straight to the trash heap of the generals and the so-called Transitional Government.

They are read, perhaps. They are respectfully received. They may even be cited in meetings and acknowledged in official speeches. But then they are ignored, because their recipients know that, the next morning, nothing will change: there will be no cost, no sanction, and no accountability.

It is the force of impunity that keeps this caravan moving. Each ignored communiqué, each unfulfilled demand, and each abandoned threat of sanction reinforces the generals' certainty that they can advance without consequences. Impunity then ceases to be merely the absence of justice: it becomes an instrument of power, a tacit authorization to continue, and an incentive for repetition. While diplomacy, en douceur, protests but does not act, the force of impunity occupies the space left by the weakness of institutions.

Guinea-Bissau does not suffer from a lack of norms, diagnoses, or diplomatic declarations. It suffers from a serious deficit in implementation.

It is in this vacuum that the established power seeks to transform force into institutional normality.

The constitutional referendum of August 30, 2026, represents a particularly serious stage in this process. An authority born from the interruption of elections, the seizure of the electoral process, and the suspension of the constitutional order has decided to submit a new power structure to a popular vote.

The provisional results announced attributed 70% of the votes to "Yes" and indicated a turnout close to 60%. However, simultaneously, polling stations were observed to be poorly attended, especially in Bissau, along with widespread ignorance of the content submitted to the referendum, a boycott by the main political force, and serious questions about the political and institutional conditions of the process.

Given these contradictions, simply announcing percentages is not enough.

It is essential to publish the minutes from each polling station, reconcile the number of voters with the ballots received, used, discarded, and returned, ensure access to the original documents, explain the discrepancies, and allow for a truly independent audit.

A ballot box does not possess the magical power to transform a coup into democracy.

Holding a referendum does not automatically remedy the illegitimacy of the convening authority. A transitional timetable does not replace the constitutional order. And future elections do not erase the interruption and confiscation of previous elections.

There is, therefore, a risk of a veritable normalization of procedures through appearances: the consolidation of power is called "transition"; the acceptance of a fait accompli is called "dialogue"; the constitutional legitimization of force is called "referendum"; and the final moment of a process carefully controlled from its inception is called "elections."

This is where the international community will have to choose.

You can continue practicing diplomacy en douceur: issuing communiqués, sending missions, conducting consultations, and repeating appeals that your recipients have learned to ignore. In that case, the dogs will continue to bark, and the caravan of military imposition will calmly continue on its way.

Or you can transform your own decisions into a coherent compliance strategy.

This requires, first and foremost, a single framework bringing together all the obligations established by the African Union and ECOWAS: the release of detainees, the restoration of political freedoms, the independence of electoral and judicial bodies, non-interference by the military, inclusive dialogue, and conditions for credible elections. Each obligation must have a designated person responsible, a deadline, a verifiable indicator, and a consequence for non-compliance.

Secondly, a genuine joint monitoring mechanism is needed between the African Union, ECOWAS, the United Nations and the CPLP. Not four parallel, sometimes contradictory, diplomatic efforts, but a single political position, a single evaluation framework and a clear division of responsibilities.

Thirdly, warnings about selective sanctions cannot remain conditional indefinitely. Travel restrictions, asset freezes, diplomatic limitations, and the suspension of certain non-humanitarian aid must be applicable against individuals identified as responsible for obstructing the return to constitutional order, engaging in political violence, or preventing the holding of free elections.

These measures should be gradual, well-founded, subject to review, and directed against the perpetrators and beneficiaries of the disruption—never against the population.

Fourthly, it is necessary to preserve the evidence. Election records, CNE (National Elections Commission) files, documents relating to the interruption of the electoral process, detentions, disappearances, political violence, intimidation, allegations of torture and administrative interference must be professionally documented and protected. The impossibility of immediate accountability cannot mean the disappearance of memory or the destruction of evidence.

Finally, mediation should not be confused with moral neutrality.

A mediator must listen to all parties and facilitate peaceful solutions. But they cannot place those who broke the constitutional order on the same level as those who demand its restoration. Impartiality in dealing with the parties does not mean neutrality in the face of coups, repression, falsification, or the confiscation of the popular will.

Guinea-Bissau does not need a tribunal similar to that of the former Yugoslavia. However, it does need the same combination that allowed that tribunal to overcome its initial irrelevance: a clear mandate, responsible leadership, credible documentation, international coordination, incentives, consequences, and persistence.

The Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia became an exception because, after years of hesitation, the international community decided to link the right to enforcement with the capacity to do so.

In Guinea-Bissau, the law has already spoken. The African Union has already spoken. ECOWAS has already spoken. The people have also spoken—first in the interrupted elections and then through the silence and distrust that marked the referendum.

What's missing is not another carefully drafted statement to be thrown in the trash.

What is lacking is the political will to enforce the decisions already made.

Otherwise, the same sad reality will continue to repeat itself: the dogs bark, the caravan of impunity passes by — and democracy is left behind.

2025/12/3